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Beyond the Great Power Competition Narrative: Exploring Labor Politics 
and Resistance behind AI Innovation in China
Yujia He and Hong Shen
Introduction 
A specter is haunting the world—the specter of artificial intelligence (AI). In the eyes of 
many, the major powers of the world have entered into an arms race in AI development. 
Policymakers in countries such as the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea 
justify the clamor for grand strategy and funding for AI research and development 
(R&D) on the basis of not being left behind in the race to automation.1 Business leaders 
and political pundits likewise tout AI and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as crucial 
to cementing international competitiveness and the future global order.2 It is easy to 
assume that whoever gets the upper hand in AI development will be handed the key to 
future economic prosperity, political prestige, and by extension, national power. Such a 
narrative frames AI development as a competitive race and is especially popular in the 
context of U.S.-China relations, where the U.S. approach has shifted from engagement 
1 Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb 11, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/doc-
uments/2019/02/14/2019-02544/maintaining-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence; The 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Recommendations on Strengthening 
American Leadership in Industries of the Future, June 2020, https://science.osti.gov/-/media/_/pdf/
about/pcast/202006/PCAST_June_2020_Report.pdf?la=en&hash=019A4F17C79FDEE5005C51D-
3D6CAC81FB31E3ABC; Ministry of Science and Technology, “Next Generation Artificial Intelli-
gence Development Plan Issued by State Council,” China Science and Technology Newsletter no. 17, 
September 15, 2017, http://fi.china-embassy.org/eng/kxjs/P020171025789108009001.pdf; Integrat-
ed Innovation Strategy Promotion Council Decision, “AI Strategy 2019 AI for Everyone: People, 
Industries, Regions and Governments,” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, June 11, 2019, https://www.
kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ai_senryaku/pdf/aistratagy2019en.pdf; “South Korea AI R&D Strategy,” OECD 
AI, https://www.oecd.ai/dashboards/policy-initiatives/2019-data-policyInitiatives-25016. 
2 Mohamed Kande and  Murat Sönmez, “Don’t Fear AI. It Will Lead to Long-Term Job Growth,” 
World Economic Forum, October 26, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/dont-fear-
ai-it-will-lead-to-long-term-job-growth; John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “The Next Space Race Is 
Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, November 3, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/03/the-
next-space-race-is-artificial-intelligence-and-america-is-losing-to-china.
[6] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Policy Forum
to “long-term strategic competition,” with maintaining technology dominance as a core 
concern.3
This AI competition narrative is flawed for several reasons.4 To begin with, knowledge 
creation and diffusion is no longer confined within one country. Literature has docu-
mented the international interdependency of science and technology,5 and the role of 
transnational capital, infrastructure, talents, and business alliances in innovation systems.6 
In AI-related research, for instance, international co-authorship accounts for on average 
35 percent of publications by the world’s top R&D investors across all industries.7 In 
addition, in much of the developing world, governments strategically collaborate with 
foreign companies for technology adoption and technology transfer.8 
More importantly, this narrative focused on competitiveness, with its singular concern for 
utilitarian gains, risks equating technological advances and economic growth with societal 
well-being. Such an approach conveniently assumes innovation as inherently beneficial 
for a nation. Yet the development of new technologies and their impact on society is 
directional.9 Innovation does not happen in a vacuum, but within a society with power 
asymmetries between stakeholders. Such power dynamics shape how innovations are 
3  Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States, Jan-
uary 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1045785.pdf; Satoru Mori, “US Technological Competi-
tion with China: the Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions,” Asia-Pacific Review 26, 
no. 1 (2019): 77-120); Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt, “Is China Beating the U.S. to AI Suprem-
acy?,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, August 2020, https://www.belfercenter.
org/publication/china-beating-us-ai-supremacy; Gregory Allen and Elsa B. Kania, “China Is Using 
America’s Own Plan to Dominate the Future of Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 
2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/08/china-is-using-americas-own-plan-to-dominate-the-fu-
ture-of-artificial-intelligence.
4  Stephen Cave and Seán S. ÓhÉigeartaigh, “An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and 
Risks,” in Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, AIES ’18 
(New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018), 36–40; Remco Zwetsloot, 
Helen Toner, and Jeffrey Ding, “Beyond the AI Arms Race: America, China, and the Dangers of 
Zero-Sum Thinking,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/
review-essay/2018-11-16/beyond-ai-arms-race.
5  Michael Zitt and Elise Bassecoulard, “Internationalisation in Science in the Prism of Bibliometric 
Indicators,” in Handbook of Quantitative Science and Technology Research, eds. Henk F. Moed, 
Wolfgang Glänzel, Ulrich Schmoch, 407-436 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004); Pari Patel and Modesto 
Vega, “Patterns of Internationalisation of Corporate Technology: Location vs. Home Country Ad-
vantages,” Research Policy 28, no. 2-3 (1999): 145-155.
6 Christian Binz and Bernhard Truffer, “Global Innovation Systems—A Conceptual Framework for 
Innovation Dynamics in Transnational Contexts,” Research Policy 46, no. 7 (2017): 1284-1298.
7 Helene Dernis, Petros Gkotsis, Nicola Grassano, Shohei Nakazato, Mariagrazia Squicciarini, Bri-
gitte van Beuzekom, and Antonio Vezzani, World Corporate Top R&D investors: Shaping the Future 
of Technologies and of AI, No. JRC117068 (Seville: Joint Research Centre, 2019).
8  Stephen Feinson, “National innovation systems overview and country cases,” in Knowledge flows 
and knowledge collectives: understanding the role of science and technology policies in develop-
ment, 23-25 (Center for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Columbia University, 2003), https://cspo.
org/legacy/library/110215F4ZY_lib_FeinsonInnovatio.pdf
9  Johan Schot and W. Edward Steinmueller, “Three Frames for Innovation Policy: R&D, Systems of 
Innovation and Transformative Change,” Research Policy 47, no. 9 (2018): 1554-1567.
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used, why they are used, and whether they lead to better or worse long-term outcomes 
for various stakeholders.10 Further, the great power competition narrative ignores the 
transnational interests and struggles of social groups and classes impacted by innovation 
development and diffusion. By placing innovation within the context of a zero-sum, 
short-term competition between nations, the narrative ignores the collective interests 
across borders of groups such as businesses, labor and trade unions, and the public, and 
their agency in shaping innovation towards benevolent or worse societal outcomes.
In this article, we argue that the lens of great power competition, though important, is 
insufficient and one-sided. China and the United States are actually facing the same set 
of challenges posed by the recent development and deployment of AI—its significant 
impact on human labor. Public imaginaries of AI’s impact mostly concern job displace-
ment, and scholars have documented the replacement of routine tasks by automation 
among both U.S. and Chinese manufacturers and the impact on workers’ power.11 The 
purpose of this paper, however, is to shed light on the less-explored areas. Using three 
cases from China, we explore novel forms of relations between labor and capital that 
have emerged behind contemporary AI developments:  how crowdworkers have been 
put into “farms” for data annotation and algorithm evaluation, how tech workers are 
exploited to fuel rapid AI innovation, and how new types of algorithmic technologies 
are used to intensify and reinvent workplace surveillance. We also discuss different tactics 
workers employ for resistance. We conclude with an alternative, dialectic approach to 
understanding AI’s impact on labor relations, calling for exchange and collaboration 
among stakeholders across countries including the United States and China to address 
the common challenges. Washington and Beijing must thus look beyond the oversim-
plifying great power competition narrative to deal with the granular human labor costs 
associated with AI development.
Hidden Labor Behind AI: Crowdworkers in China 
Past scholarship has pointed out that rather than being fully automated, contemporary AI 
systems have actually been supported by different types of invisible human labor—what 
10  Elisa Giuliani, “Regulating Global Capitalism amid Rampant Corporate Wrongdoing—Reply to 
“Three Frames for Innovation Policy,” Research Policy 47, no. 9 (2018): 1577-1582; Mark Anner, 
Nicolas Pons-Vignon, and Uma Rani, “For a Future of Work with Dignity: A Critique of the World 
Bank Development Report, The Changing Nature of Work,” Global Labour Journal 10, no. 1 (2019): 
2-18; Louis Hyman, “It’s Not Technology That’s Disrupting Our Jobs,” New York Times, August 18, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/opinion/technology/technology-gig-economy.html. 
11  David Autor, David Mindell, and Elisabeth Reynolds, The Work of the Future: Building Better 
Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines, MIT Work of the Future, 2020, https://workofthefuture.mit.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Final-Report4.pdf; CEES Research Team, “How are Chinese 
Manufacturing Firms Coping with Rising Labor Costs: A Report of China Employer-Employee Sur-
vey (2015-2016),” Journal of Macro-Quality Research 5, no. 2 (2017): 1-21; Yu Huang and Naubahar 
Sharif, “From ‘Labour Dividend’ to ‘Robot Dividend’: Technological Change and Workers’ Power in 
South China,” Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy 6, no. 1 (2017): 53-78; Naubahar Sharif 
and Yu Huang, “Industrial Automation in China’s ‘Workshop of the World’,” The China Journal 81, 
no. 1 (2019): 1-22.
[8] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Policy Forum
Gray and Suri termed as “ghost work.”12 Crowdsourced workers have long been an 
important part of this “ghost work.” As scholars have discussed, many critical fields in 
contemporary AI (for example, Computer Vision13 and Natural Language Processing14) 
rely on large-scale human labor for data annotation and algorithm evaluation, which has 
been increasingly outsourced to a variety of crowdsourcing platforms. An example of 
a U.S.-based platform is Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk), operated under Amazon 
Web Services for businesses (known as requesters) to hire online crowdworkers to 
perform on-demand tasks.15
China is an important node in this globalized crowdsourcing landscape. By the end of 
2017, there were already 30 million crowdworkers in China serving more than 190,000 
enterprises and individuals on a global level. Chinese government policies, such as 
the “mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation program,” contributed to the boom. 
Moreover, in China, crowdworkers have also been put into “crowdfarms.”16 Instead of 
on-demand individuals working on decomposed tasks, crowdfarm workers in China 
are organized by companies like ZBJ and Epwk, which often take crowdsourced work 
en masse from requesters, and organize individual workers to complete them. Crowd-
farm workers usually work full time with salary and benefits, yet workers also reported 
exhaustion from overwork and frequent delays in compensation.17 Some crowdfarm 
workers have also reported substandard working conditions, such as cramped office 
spaces that lack air-conditioning. The growing power of crowdfarms in China has also 
generated increasing pressure for individual crowdworkers. For example, crowdfarms 
12 Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri, Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley from Building a New 
Global Underclass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
13  Computer Vision is a field of artificial intelligence that trains computers and systems to “derive 
meaningful information from digital images, videos and other visual inputs — and take actions or 
make recommendations based on that information” (“What is Computer Vision?,” IBM, https://
www.ibm.com/topics/computer-vision). An example of a problem in Computer Vision is facial 
recognition, to match a human face from digital images or videos against databases of faces to 
authenticate the identity of the person.
14  Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a field of artificial intelligence that “trains computers to 
understand, interpret and manipulate human language” (“What is Natural Language Processing?,” 
SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-natural-language-processing-nlp.html). 
An example of NLP in applications is a virtual assistant like Alexa or Siri that interprets the voice 
command of users and responds accordingly.
15 Lilly Irani, “The Cultural Work of Microwork,” New Media and Society 17, no. 5 (2013): 1-21; Lilly 
C. Irani and M. Silberman, “Turkopticon: Interrupting Worker Invisibility in Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk,” in  Proceedings of the 2013 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 
(2013): 611–20; Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen, “Excavating AI: The Politics of Images in Ma-
chine Learning Training Sets,” 2019, https://www.excavating.ai/; Kate Crawford and Vladan Joler, 
“Anatomy of an AI System,” https://anatomyof.ai/. 
16 Yihong Wang et al., “Crowdsourcing in China: Exploring the Work Experiences of Solo Crowd-
workers and Crowdfarm Workers,” Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (2020): 1–13 .
17  Bailing Yi, “Rengong zhineng beihou de rengong: shuju biaozhu shixin suoshui yi ban, qianxin 
gaofa” 人工智能背后的‘工人’: 数据标注时薪缩水一半，欠薪高发 [The “Workers” behind 
Artificial Intelligence: Data Shows Hourly Salaries Have Shrunk by Half, High Incidence of Overdue 
Salaries], Diyi Caijing, November 25, 2020, https://www.yicai.com/news/100852901.html.
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often undercut their bids in order to secure more jobs, which has decreased the overall 
pricing of crowdsourcing tasks on the market. As crowdfarms increasingly dominate 
the crowdsourcing landscape in China, individual crowdworkers will face the pressure 
to lower their bids as well.18
As tech firms increasingly outsource labor-intensive tasks like sound recognition and 
video and image labeling to save costs, crowdworkers in China have become part of the 
global AI value chain.19 While this leads to job creation in number, and may benefit 
people seeking flexible work, it offers workers unstable pay and limited career advance-
ment. An International Labour Organization (ILO) study of Chinese crowdsourcing 
platforms cautioned that unpaid time spent searching for tasks, seeking clarifications 
from requesters and platforms, and contesting nonpayment and negative reviews led to 
long and fragmented working hours, and effectively lower earnings.20 Most microtasks for 
crowdworkers, such as data labeling or transcription, are simple and repetitive, therefore 
offering little opportunities for career growth. With future development of AI, these 
workers may also one day find their tasks becoming fully automated, and their training 
and work experience obsolete. 
Indeed, as Gray and Suri argue, the development of AI has partially contributed to the 
rise of a “new global underclass” with low and unstable wages, substandard working 
conditions, and few opportunities to apply their work experiences to new jobs.21 The 
experiences of Chinese crowdworkers offer an important case to illustrate the conditions 
of this new global class of workers.     
Tech Workers’ Resistance: The 996.ICU Movement 
Tech workers have been a major force behind contemporary AI development. However, 
rather than serving as the silent “secret source” or the massive “brain power” behind 
China’s surge in the global AI landscape, Chinese tech workers have mobilized to resist 
increasingly harsh labor exploitation. 
18 Wang et al., “Crowdsourcing in China: Exploring the Work Experiences of Solo Crowdworkers 
and Crowdfarm Workers,” 6-7.
19 Dmitry Matskevich, “Low-wage workers drive the global AI labor market,” VentureBeat, Decem-
ber 12, 2017, https://venturebeat.com/2017/12/12/low-wage-workers-drive-the-global-ai-labor-mar-
ket; Huizong Wu, “China Is Achieving AI Dominance by Relying on Young Blue-Collar Workers,” 
Vice, December 21, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xyabb/china-ai-dominance-re-
lies-on-young-data-labelers; Miaomiao Yu, “The Humans Behind Artificial Intelligence,” Synced, 
April 30, 2017, https://medium.com/syncedreview/the-humans-behind-artificial-intelligence-3ff-
578cfcc60. 
20  Irene Zhou, “Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection in China,” International Labour 
Organization Working Paper 11, October 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/-
--ro-bangkok/---ilo-beijing/documents/publication/wcms_757923.pdf. 
21  Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri, Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley from Building a New 
Global Underclass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
[10] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Policy Forum
Indeed, China offers an important case to illustrate the exploitation of the tech labor 
force behind the rapid development of AI. A recent example is the 996.ICU movement. 
Despite being relatively well paid compared to traditional industries, tech employees 
in China have been asked to work an extended schedule known as the “996 schedule”: 
9AM to 9PM, 6 days a week.22 The economic downturn and the downsizing of the 
tech sector in particular since 2018 have cultivated growing discontent toward the 996 
overwork culture. This is because the past reciprocal employment relationship has been 
disrupted—workers still work the extended long hours, but report getting much less 
compensation in bonuses, with limited career advancement amidst waves of layoffs.23 
In March 2019, an anonymous user set up the 996.ICU project on GitHub, an online 
code sharing community owned by Microsoft, complaining that serious labor exploita-
tion would eventually destroy employees’ health and send them to the intensive care 
unit (ICU).24 
Unlike traditional labor movements in the manufacturing sector, during the 996.ICU 
movement Chinese tech workers employed “networked and disconnected” tactics to 
introduce public pressure to their employers to cause reputational damage.25 This included 
setting up a repository on GitHub for “blacklist companies” that have a similar over-
working schedule, such as Alibaba, Jingdong ( JD), and Huawei, and calling on fellow 
workers and netizens to mail China’s Labor Law, which specifically forbids such labor 
exploitation, to Jack Ma—the founder of Alibaba who commented that the 996 schedule 
could be a “huge blessing” for young workers and only backtracked following online 
backlash.26 Workers started to form a shared identity by recognizing themselves as 
“white-collar working-class developers,” and even framed the movement as a class strug-
gle between the working class and capitalists.27 A new basis of international solidarity 
also emerged. For example, a group of GitHub and Microsoft workers openly supported 
Chinese workers by calling on Microsoft to keep the 996.ICU project uncensored.28
22 Qiqing Lin and Raymong Zhong, “‘996’ Is China’s Version of Hustle Culture. Tech Workers Are 
Sick of It,” New York Times, April 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/technology/chi-
na-996-jack-ma.html.
23 Xiaonan Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China: Changing Employment Relations and Labour 
Agency in the Tech Industry,” Made in China Journal 4, no. 2 (June 18, 2019), https://madeinchina-
journal.com/2019/06/18/the-996-icu-movement-in-china-changing-employment-relations-and-la-
bour-agency-in-the-tech-industry; Takashi Kawakami, “Wave of Layoffs Washes Over China’s Tech 
Giants,” Nikkei Asia, March 22, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Wave-of-layoffs-
washes-over-China-s-tech-giants 
24 “996icu/996.ICU,” GitHub, https://github.com/996icu/996.ICU.
25 Kevin Lin, “Tech Worker Organizing in China: A New Model for Workers Battling a Repressive 
State,” New Labor Forum 29, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 56-58.
26  The online call for “Mailing Labor Law to Jack Ma” and the netizens’ posts of the mailed Labor 
Law copies can be accessed at the GitHub at https://github.com/CPdogson/996action/blob/mas-
ter/54law/pic.md. 
27  Lichen Zhen, “Social Coding Platform as Digital Enclave: A Case Study of Protesting ‘996’ on 
GitHub,” International Journal of Communication 15 (2021): 19.
28 Caroline O’Donovan, “A Post about China’s ‘996’ Workweek Went Viral on GitHub: Now Micro-
soft Employees Want to Protect It from Censorship,” BuzzFeed News, April 22, 2019, https://www.
buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/microsoft-petition-996-icu-workweek-china.
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Although the 996.ICU movement was criticized for failing to generate structural chang-
es,29 it has nevertheless demonstrated the agency of tech workers behind the curtain 
of China’s AI innovations and their resistance against inhumane working conditions. 
Similarly, in the United States, tech workers have also mobilized around issues like 
sexual harassment, gender inequities, and unethical research.30 Often seen as elitist and 
difficult to organize, tech workers in both countries are mobilized to resist what they 
perceive to be unethical and intolerable behaviors in their own industries. 
Watched by the Algorithmic Boss: The Intensification of Workplace Surveillance 
The ubiquity of AI-enabled services has given rise to “surveillance capitalism,” where 
behavioral data harvested by tech firms about consumers is used to enhance algorithms 
and provide predictions. 31 This, in turn, is sold to business consumers, essentially rendering 
users as “free commodities” under surveillance. Such automated predictive analytics have 
also aided the already pervasive surveillance of workers. Workplace surveillance is often 
deployed for enhancing productivity and security, but may also result in the erosion of 
workers’ privacy, and results-based management ignoring workers’ needs.32 As reported 
by BBC in 2019, over half of global companies with over USD 750 million revenues 
used nontraditional surveillance methods, including tracking keystrokes, monitoring 
emails and monitoring conversations at work.33 A 2012 report found that 37 percent of 
U.S. employers tracked the locations of workers on service calls via handheld devices or 
vehicles.34 Surveillance has also grown outside the workplace, including GPS tracking 
on employees’ phones, social media monitoring, and even exercise and sleep pattern 
tracking.35 Workforce analytics is predicted to become a USD 1.87 billion industry by 
2025.36 For instance, Amazon has developed AI-enabled tools like wristbands to track 
29 Kevin Lin, “Tech Worker Organizing in China,” 58.  
30 Kate Conger and Noam Scheiber, “Employee Activism Is Alive in Tech. It Stops Short of Orga-
nizing Unions,” New York Times, July 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/technology/
tech-companies-union-organizing.html. 
31 Shoshana Zuboff, “Surveillance Capitalism and the Challenge of Collective Action,” New Labor 
Forum 28, no. 1 (2019): 10–29. 
32 Kirstie Ball, “Workplace Surveillance: An Overview,” Labor History 51, no. 1 (2010): 93-100.
33  Padraig Belton, “How Does It Feel to Be Watched at Work All the Time?” BBC News, April 11, 
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47879798.
34 Spencer E. Ante and Lauren Weber, “Memo to Workers: The Boss is Watching: Tracking Technol-
ogy Shakes Up the Workplace,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2013, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303672404579151440488919138.
35  Lewis Maltby, “Employment Privacy: Is There Anything Left?” Human Rights 39, no.3 (2013).
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2013_
vol_39/may_2013_n2_privacy/employment_privacy; Luke Tredinnick and Claire Laybats, “Work-
place Surveillance,” Business Information Review 36, no. 2 (2019): 50–52; Christopher Rowland, 
“With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor Your Every Step — and Possibly 
More,” Washington Post, February 15, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econo-
my/with-fitness-trackers-in-the-workplace-bosses-can-monitor-your-every-step--and-possibly-
more/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a45-11e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html. 
36  Belton, “How Does It Feel to Be Watched at Work All the Time?” 
[12] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
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employees’ activities,37 and management systems that could fire employees without 
human supervisors’ involvement.38 The shift to working from home during the COVID-
19 pandemic has further normalized the deployment of algorithmic surveillance tools, 
such as software running in the background of employees’ personal computers to assess 
productivity.39
Like their counterparts in developed countries, Chinese workers also face an escalation 
of AI-enabled workplace surveillance, often without their consent and consultation. 
For instance, an electronics producer in Wuxi introduced an automated management 
system to monitor workers’ productivity as required by its U.S. headquarters, using data 
from surveillance cameras and employees’ punch cards. This resulted in dubious situ-
ations in salary calculation as reported by workers, such as an automatic deduction of 
RMB 50 for three seconds over time in the restroom. Another tech firm in Hangzhou 
mandated employees to use company-provided chair cushions, tracking personal data 
such as heart rate, breathing and posture to predict workers’ productivity without their 
consent. Such practices are not limited to subsidiaries of foreign firms or private firms. 
A state-owned electricity firm in Beijing used a management system that automatically 
adjusted workers’ bonuses based on their company card activity. When an employee 
had more than five instances in a month of physically leaving the workplace and using 
the card during working hours, even for legitimate reasons such as going to the super-
market to buy food, the system would automatically deduct a portion of the worker’s 
annual bonus. As the company deliberately withheld such surveillance practices from 
the employees, few employees were aware that their geolocational timeline and spending 
data were being surveilled.40
The prospect of resisting algorithmic workplace surveillance is uncertain. Workers in 
developed countries can turn surveillance into a “base for organizing,” as several unions 
in the United States have negotiated employment contracts that bar practices such as 
the use of GPS tracking for disciplinary action and email monitoring beyond reasonable 
cause.41 In other Global North countries such as France, workplace surveillance  with-
37  Ceylan Yeginsu, “If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for 
It.),” New York Times, February 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/ama-
zon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html.
38  Julie Bort, “Amazon’s Warehouse-Worker Tracking System Can Automatically Pick People to Fire 
Without a Human Supervisor’s Involvement,” Business Insider, April 25, 2019, https://www.busines-
sinsider.com/amazon-system-automatically-fires-warehouse-workers-time-off-task-2019-4. 
39  Will D. Heaven, “This Startup Is Using AI to Give Workers a “Productivity Score,” MIT Technolo-
gy Review, June 4, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/04/1002671/startup-ai-work-
ers-productivity-score-bias-machine-learning-business-covid.
40 Liu Chang, “Bei suanfa jiankong de dagong ren: you ren qu xishoujian chaoshi 3 miao kou gongzi 
shangban mai fan bei kou wugong fei” 被算法监控的打工人：有人去洗手间超时3秒扣工资 上
班买饭被扣误工费 [The Workers Monitored by Algorithm: Salary Deduction for Spending Three 
Seconds too Long in the Bathroom, Tardiness Fee Charged for Buying Meal], Caijing, January 23, 
2021, https://www.sohu.com/a/444087044_120774106.
41 Dan Clawson and Mary Ann Clawson. “IT Is Watching: Workplace Surveillance and Worker 
Resistance,” New Labor Forum 26, no. 2 2017): 66-68.
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out consultation with the workers’ council is a criminal offense.42 In comparison, legal 
protection of an employee’s privacy rights has been relatively weak in China.43 While 
the draft Law on the Protection of Personal Information, circulated in 2020, offers the 
potential of requiring consent in data gathering, it remains to be seen how such laws 
will be finalized and implemented.44 Combined with the employer-employee power 
asymmetry, employers will likely still have significant room to obtain personal data for 
surveillance.     
Conclusion
In this article, we drew upon three cases from China to explore novel forms of labor-cap-
ital relationships that have emerged with the development and deployment of AI systems. 
Moving beyond the well-documented impact of AI on manufacturing labor, we shifted 
our attention to the often hidden and invisible crowdworkers sitting behind many 
contemporary AI systems, the “white-collar working-class developers” exploited by 
China’s tech industry, and the everyday workers that have been increasingly monitored 
and surveilled by algorithmic tools. We also noted new forms of resistance emerging 
from our cases, echoing many similar practices in the Global North. Indeed, in some 
cases, a new basis of international solidarity has also started to unfold, as we discussed 
in the case of the 996.ICU movement. 
We therefore echo the scholarship calling for a dialectical, nuanced approach to under-
standing the changing nature of work in China and in the Global South.45 We do not side 
with the technology-deterministic approach that emphasizes AI’s potential for produc-
tivity and economic growth, and an arms-race view of interstate relations as a zero-sum 
game of catching up in innovation development and adoption. Such an approach favors 
the benefits accrued to transnational capital and reduces labor to a factor of production 
to be upgraded, educated, and reskilled in the face of algorithms. It further ignores the 
agency of labor, and other societal actors, to shape how the adoption of AI will unravel 
in each society around the world. On the other hand, we also caution against an overly 
optimistic view that the power of labor in each society, and their collective power across 
the world, can effectively shape the policy discussions around AI and the course of AI 
adoption towards more humane outcomes. In developed economies such as the EU and 
United States, workers have resisted an unfair working environment with the help of 
relatively strong social protection, labor unionization, and labor policies. Calls against the 
monopolizing power of Big Tech are also growing among policymakers and scholars, and 
workers themselves have organized to bargain for their interests. In comparison, as this 
42 Ann C. Hodges, “Bargaining for Privacy in the Unionized Workplace,” International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 22, no. 2 (2006): 174.
43 Mimi Zou, “Rethinking Online Privacy in the Chinese Workplace: Employee Dismissals over 
Social Media Posts,” Made in China Journal, October 18, 2018, https://madeinchinajournal.
com/2018/10/18/rethinking-online-privacy-in-the-chinese-workplace. 
44  Anja Geller, “How Comprehensive Is Chinese Data Protection Law? A Systematisation of Chinese 
Data Protection Law from a European Perspective,” GRUR International 69, no. 12 (2020): 1193, 
1197, 1202. 
45  See Huang and Sharif, “From ‘Labour Dividend’ to ‘Robot Dividend.’”
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study of China shows, workers are being roped in the global capitalist networks under-
pinning AI-enabled innovations, while facing precarious working conditions with little 
guaranteed protection. Understanding of the working conditions currently relies more on 
personal accounts or news stories than rigorous data, and is further constrained by the 
workers’ limited awareness of their structural positions of being exploited. Government 
policies provide limited regulatory guidance or enforcement, and uncertain bargaining 
power for workers seeking fairer treatment. Similar dynamics have been observed in 
other Global South countries such as India,  Brazil, and the Philippines.46
With increasing diffusion of innovation and the expansion of Big Tech into the Global 
South, workers in those countries have increasingly become a crucial part of the global 
value chain of AI. Their working conditions and the issues arising from the labor conten-
tions in such countries will only become more salient. As AI gets increasingly adopted 
in all corners of life, there is growing scholarly and media attention on the plight of the 
workers. Whether this would provoke greater consciousness among the workers and 
the larger society to demand policy actions, however, is an open question. This presents 
an opportunity for international cooperation, in terms of exchanging information and 
data, searching for solutions, and formulating and implementing government regula-
tions and best practices.47 Greater awareness, communication, and cooperation among 
policymakers, practitioners, scholars, workers, NGOs, and other concerned actors is 
needed. Exchanges across national borders, including among the two largest economies, 
the United States and China, would be vital, to help ensure workers’ well-being, and 
the global transition towards a more economically and socially equitable machine age.
46 Munsif Vengattil and Paresh Dave, “Facebook ‘Labels’ Posts by Hand, Posing Privacy Questions,” 
Reuters, May 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-ai-focus/facebook-labels-posts-
by-hand-posing-privacy-questions-idUSKCN1SC01T; Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri, “The Hu-
mans Working behind the AI Curtain.” Harvard Business Review 9 (2017): 2-5; Felix Holtwell, “‘We 
Must Think about a Tech Workers’ Strike’: An Interview with the Infoproletários,” Notes from Below, 
October 1, 2018, https://notesfrombelow.org/article/we-must-think-about-a-tech-workers-strike; 
Adrian Chen, “The Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings Out of Your Facebook Feed,” 
Wired, October 23, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation.
47 Yujia He, “Developing Resilient Economies in the Age of AI,” United Nations University Centre 
for Policy Research, December 7, 2018, https://cpr.unu.edu/ai-global-governance-developing-resil-
ient-economies-in-the-age-of-ai.html.
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